Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism

Stump (2007) argued for a virtue epistemological reading of Duhem's good sense: according to him Duhem advanced good sense as a source of justified beliefs about theory choice and as a mark of the cognitive character of the physicist. Ivanova (2010) argues that Duhem proposed good sense as a post hoc explanation of theory choice rather than as a justification of it. I contend that Ivanova’s reading of Duhem is inaccurate and that good sense can indeed be accommodated within virtue epistemology. However Stump’s account is incomplete: I propose that within virtue epistemology, agent reliabilism best accommodates Duhemian good sense

Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism

Stump (2007) argues for a virtue epistemological reading of Duhem's good sense: according to him Duhem advanced good sense as a source of justified beliefs about theory choice and as a mark of the cognitive character of the physicist. Ivanova (2010) argues that Duhem proposed good sense as a post hoc explanation of theory choice rather than as a justification of it. Fairweather (2011) has advanced a "hybrid position" combining Stump's and Ivanova's views. I contend that Ivanova’s reading of Duhem is inaccurate and that good sense can indeed be accommodated within virtue epistemology. However Stump’s account is incomplete: I propose that within virtue epistemology, agent reliabilism best accommodates Duhemian good sense. Moreover, no hybrid reading is required: I argue that agent reliabilism fully accommodates Duhem's position on good sense. Finally I also explore the relevance of a reliabilist reading of Duhem to the debate on how to deal with the Problem of Induction in scientific practice

Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism

Stump (2007) argues for a virtue epistemological reading of Duhem's good sense: according to him Duhem advanced good sense as a source of justified beliefs about theory choice and as a mark of the cognitive character of the physicist. Ivanova (2010) argues that Duhem proposed good sense as a post hoc explanation of theory choice rather than as a justification of it. Fairweather (2011) has advanced a "hybrid position" combining Stump's and Ivanova's views. I contend that Ivanova’s reading of Duhem is inaccurate and that good sense can indeed be accommodated within virtue epistemology. However Stump’s account is incomplete: I propose that within virtue epistemology, agent reliabilism best accommodates Duhemian good sense. Moreover, no hybrid reading is required: I argue that agent reliabilism fully accommodates Duhem's position on good sense. Finally I also explore the relevance of a reliabilist reading of Duhem to the debate on how to deal with the Problem of Induction in scientific practice

Revisiting Stance Voluntarism: In Defense of an Active Stance Pluralism

Bas van Fraassen’s stance voluntarism has raised the question of how to justify one’s own stance choice if one is to follow the voluntarist dictum that all rational stances, i.e. all those that don’t lead to ‘self-sabotage by one’s own lights’, are equally rational. van Fraassen’s response is that one justifies their stance choice based on one’s own values, but the problem is that those values only appeal to holders of the said stance and not others. In this paper I propose a pragmatist approach to justifying stance choice. I argue that we can provide stance-transcendent justification for our choice of stance based on its stance-transcendent benefits. Consequently, multiple stances having stance-transcendent benefits should all be embraced as it is the epistemically virtuous thing to do. I advocate a move away from the standard voluntarist position of being a stance monist in practice – i.e. defending and holding only one stance – while acknowledging other rational stances only begrudgingly. I defend an active stance pluralism where we strive to actively hold different (apparently conflicting) stances depending on the context. Where that’s not possible, I propose that we should at least enthusiastically encourage multiple stances (taken by others). In Section 1 I introduce epistemic stances via a discussion of stance empiricism and stance scientific realism. In Section 2 I discuss the problem of stance justification and explore a few different existing teleological proposals for stance choice. Finally in Section 3 based on numerous examples from science and philosophy, I argue for a pragmatic, active, normative stance pluralism. I conclude with some clarifications on the rationale behind active stance pluralism

Revisiting Stance Voluntarism: In Defense of an Active Stance Pluralism

Bas van Fraassen’s stance voluntarism has raised the question of how to justify one’s own stance choice if one is to follow the voluntarist dictum that all rational stances, i.e. all those that don’t lead to ‘self-sabotage by one’s own lights’, are equally rational. van Fraassen’s response is that one justifies their stance choice based on one’s own values, but the problem is that those values only appeal to holders of the said stance and not others. In this paper I propose a pragmatist approach to justifying stance choice. I argue that we can provide stance-transcendent justification for our choice of stance based on its stance-transcendent benefits. Consequently, multiple stances having stance-transcendent benefits should all be embraced as it is the epistemically virtuous thing to do. I advocate a move away from the standard voluntarist position of being a stance monist in practice – i.e. defending and holding only one stance – while acknowledging other rational stances only begrudgingly. I defend an active stance pluralism where we strive to actively hold different (apparently conflicting) stances depending on the context. Where that’s not possible, I propose that we should at least enthusiastically encourage multiple stances (taken by others). In Section 1 I introduce epistemic stances via a discussion of stance empiricism and stance scientific realism. In Section 2 I discuss the problem of stance justification and explore a few different existing teleological proposals for stance choice. Finally in Section 3 based on numerous examples from science and philosophy, I argue for a pragmatic, active, normative stance pluralism. I conclude with some clarifications on the rationale behind active stance pluralism

Scientific Understanding and Pragmatic Rationality

This dissertation is on scientific understanding, pragmatic rationality, and values in science. I argue for an 'egalitarian' picture of theoretic values and aims in science. Both anti-realists and realists demand that a good theory be empirically adequate. In my dissertation I focus on one important job for science that often does not care for empirical adequacy -- understanding. I look at some important modes of achieving understanding in science and show that they often have very little to do with empirical adequacy. After looking at understanding got from the 'products' of science viz. theories and models, I focus on understanding in relation to activities and practices. This is centered on Hasok Chang's (2009) work on ontological principles and the intelligibility of epistemic activities. Chang's view is that in order for our (pragmatically chosen) epistemic activities to make sense to us, we cannot deny certain corresponding ontological principles, for if we did, the activities would be rendered unintelligible. Finally I look at Duhem's philosophy of physical theory. I situate Duhem among some of his key historical contemporaries Mach, Pearson, and Poincaré and engage in a comparative analysis of these 20th century historian-scientist-philosophers all of whom are widely perceived as paradigmatic instrumentalists. I then launch into Duhem's philosophy. Duhem believed that the aim of physical theory is to classify experimental laws, and that this classification progressively approaches a natural, underlying classification -- call this latter the thesis of natural classification. First I argue that contrary to the views of many scholars, Duhem was not a structural realist. I contend that Duhem was not concerned with structure as it is generally construed, viz. the mathematical form of equations. Duhem was rather concerned with the classification of laws by theory. Finally, I look at Duhem's rationale behind his idea of natural classification. I situate Duhem in Chang's activity-and- principle scheme and argue that for Duhem, in order for the physicist to make sense of her activity of theorizing, she had to affirm the 'principle' or thesis of natural classification. This way I make the move from (Changian) understanding in science, to (Duhemian) understanding of scienc

Scientific Understanding and Pragmatic Rationality

This dissertation is on scientific understanding, pragmatic rationality, and values in science. I argue for an 'egalitarian' picture of theoretic values and aims in science. Both anti-realists and realists demand that a good theory be empirically adequate. In my dissertation I focus on one important job for science that often does not care for empirical adequacy -- understanding. I look at some important modes of achieving understanding in science and show that they often have very little to do with empirical adequacy. After looking at understanding got from the 'products' of science viz. theories and models, I focus on understanding in relation to activities and practices. This is centered on Hasok Chang's (2009) work on ontological principles and the intelligibility of epistemic activities. Chang's view is that in order for our (pragmatically chosen) epistemic activities to make sense to us, we cannot deny certain corresponding ontological principles, for if we did, the activities would be rendered unintelligible. Finally I look at Duhem's philosophy of physical theory. I situate Duhem among some of his key historical contemporaries Mach, Pearson, and Poincaré and engage in a comparative analysis of these 20th century historian-scientist-philosophers all of whom are widely perceived as paradigmatic instrumentalists. I then launch into Duhem's philosophy. Duhem believed that the aim of physical theory is to classify experimental laws, and that this classification progressively approaches a natural, underlying classification -- call this latter the thesis of natural classification. First I argue that contrary to the views of many scholars, Duhem was not a structural realist. I contend that Duhem was not concerned with structure as it is generally construed, viz. the mathematical form of equations. Duhem was rather concerned with the classification of laws by theory. Finally, I look at Duhem's rationale behind his idea of natural classification. I situate Duhem in Chang's activity-and- principle scheme and argue that for Duhem, in order for the physicist to make sense of her activity of theorizing, she had to affirm the 'principle' or thesis of natural classification. This way I make the move from (Changian) understanding in science, to (Duhemian) understanding of scienc